In Dissent

Following are quotations from recent dissenting opinions from courts of all levels in the United States.

... the majority takes a giant leap toward effectively conferring party status on victims by broadening their rights in a manner not contemplated by our constitution, statutes, or rules. We respectfully dissent.

The City persuasively argues that “River Watch may not change its legal theory on appeal.” River Watch is raising a new argument on appeal, it is doing so on a key issue in the case, and it is doing so after having consciously declined, for strategic reasons, to raise the Wickes theory in the district 26 CALIFORNIA RIVER WATCH V. CITY OF VACAVILLE court. I would not reward River Watch’s gamesmanship.

Applicants raise contested legal questions about an important federal statute on which the lower courts are split and on which this Court has never actually spoken. These questions call for considered decisionmaking, informed by full briefing and argument.

If a single statute represents the best of America, it is the Voting Rights Act. It marries two great ideals: democracy and racial equality. And it dedicates our country to carrying them out.​

Based on that implausible reading, the Court summarily reverses the Eleventh Circuit’s grant of relief. The lengths to which this Court goes to ensure that Reeves remains on death row are extraordinary. I respectfully dissent.

Today’s analysis marks reporting and disclosure requirements with a bull’s-eye. Regulated entities who wish to avoid their obligations can do so by vaguely waving toward First Amendment “privacy concerns.”

This Court’s holding provides the legislature with unconstitutional carte blanche to limit the constitutional right to trial by jury through hostile legislation

I express these views with hesitation and great respect for the district court and its well-intentioned efforts to deal with an avalanche of sentencing modifications that followed in the wake of Amendment 782.

While this is a possible reading, it is not what the statute actually says. The statute begins with the phrase “except as otherwise provided in this section,” and it follows that clause with basic operative language

This reasoning is unprecedented and troubling. To start, it is quite misleading to suggest that Westinghouse was based on an interpretation of the 1870 Patent Act.

The Court’s decision today not only reads the stringent sufficiency requirements for a Request right out of the statute, but under the precedent it establishes, every future defamation plaintiff will claim a casual tweet or website posting as a Change that gets them through the § 73.055(a) toll booth. The Act’s intricate design has been destroyed.

This argument has no textual, structural, or historical support. Because there is no reason to treat private condemnation suits differently from any other cause of action created pursuant to the Commerce Clause, I respectfully dissent.